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Abstract
Institutions, and more specically private property rights, have
come to be seen as a major determinant of long-run economic develop-
ment. We evaluate the case for property rights as an explanatory factor
of the Industrial Revolution and derive some lessons for the analysis
of developing countries today. We pay particular attention to the role
of property rights in the accumulation of physical capital and the pro-
duction of new ideas. The evidence that we review from the economic
history literature does not support the institutional thesis.
Keywords: Institutions and Economic Development; Property Rights;
Industrial Revolution; long-run growth.
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1 Introduction
Economiststhinking of the growth process has shifted its focus of attention
more than once over time. From Adam Smiths classical thesis emphasizing
the division of labour and the extent of the market, economists have put
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forward the role of physical and human capital accumulation, technological
progress, and - more and more nowadays - institutions.
The current interest in the role of institutions derives from the inability of
the research programme of Solow (1956), Romer (1986, 1990) and followers
to uncover the "deeper" determinants of economic growth. Neoclassical and
endogenous growth theories provide a transparent - if somewhat mechanistic
- explanation of how capital and ideas are accumulated and produce higher
output. But if stocks of capital and ideas can be accumulated following
the processes described by these theories the obvious question is why this
accumulation is not taking place everywhere in the world and since the dawn
of history. Thats where institutions come in.
The current conception of institutions and how they a¤ect economic
growth is derived to a large extent from the work of Douglass C. North.
Norths best metaphor is perhaps that institutions are "the rules of the
game" of a society (North 1990). What is meant by this is that institutions
establish the constraints, determine the costs and benets, under which
individuals take their economic decisions. Why do so many countries fail to
develop? Because their institutions are such that individuals do not nd it
protable to invest in physical capital, human capital, and new ideas.
North has gone to great lengths to build the case for the importance
of institutions in theoretical terms (North 1981, 1990, 2005) and has in-
terpreted the evolution of early modern Europe from that theoretical per-
spective (North and Thomas 1973, North 1981, North and Weingast 1989).
The last decade has seen the development of a considerable empirical litera-
ture aiming to show that institutions are "a fundamental cause of long-run
growth" (Acemoglu et al. 2005).1 Today the idea that institutions are one of
the central factors explaining the Industrial Revolution and the di¤erences
1Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) are the seminal contributions in this literature; but see
also Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik
et al. (2004) and Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009). For a comparison of many of these papers
see Hansson (2009). For dissenting views see Glaeser et al. (2004) and Angeles (2010).
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in economic development around the world is widely accepted in academic
and policy circles.
The problem of endogeneity in the empirical literature is always recog-
nized but never fully solved (institutions cause development but development
also causes institutions). The literature has favored the use of IV regres-
sions where geographic and historically-determined variables play the role
of instruments. While highly suggestive, the conclusions of this empirical
literature can always be questioned for its dependence on the assumptions
underlying IV estimation. Indeed, geographic and historically-determined
variables may well inuence long-run growth through channels other than
institutional development.2
Because of the above caveat, the present paper takes an alternative
route to study the question. We focus on the most paradigmatic example
of growth-enhancing institutions: the protection of private property rights.
We then consult the economic history literature for evidence of the role of
property rights as a major driver of the Industrial Revolution through their
purported e¤ects on the accumulation of capital and ideas. Most of our
discussion is empirical, but we will pay attention to the theoretical case for
the importance of property rights whenever we nd it lacking. Although
we focus on pre-industrial Europe, we believe that important lessons can
be learned for the analysis of developing countries today. Accordingly, we
extend some of our discussions in that direction.
We close this introduction by noting that the ongoing discussion of the
role of institutions on economic development is not purely academic but has
large implications for policy making. As Adam Przeworski has put it, the
results from this literature can be used to justify "institutional engineering"
2For instance, while Acemoglu et al. (2001) stress that geography and history de-
termined the degree of European settlement and that European settlers brought their
institutions with them, Glaeser et al. (2004) retort that European settlers brought many
other things with them - starting with their own human capital. For additional works on
the consequences of European settlement see Angeles (2007) and Angeles and Neanidis
(2009, 2010). For a discussion of the endogeneity issues in the institutional literature see
Paldam and Gundlach (2008).
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(Przeworski 2004); whereby developing countriesinstitutions would try to
be modelled in the image of those from developed nations. Before advocating
such a large-scale experiment, economist have the duty to subject their
hypotheses to as many di¤erent types of falsication attempts as possible.
Looking at the historical record appears to be as good a verication strategy
as any other we can think of.
2 Institutions
"Institutions" is a dangerous word; its meaning is not immediately evident
and will change according to the context and the academic discipline where
its being used. In economics, the most inuential theoreticians of the role
of institutions have pioneered universal and overarching denitions of them.
Thus, Douglass North:
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that struc-
ture political, economic and social interaction. They consist
of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, tra-
ditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions,
laws, property rights).
North (1990, p. 97)
And similarly, Avner Greif:
An institution is a system of rules, beliefs, norms and organi-
zations that together generate a regularity of (social) behavior.
Greif (2006, p. 30)
A problem with denitions such as the above ones is that they are too
broad for meaningful empirical testing. A theory of the importance of in-
stitutions that uses such an all-encompassing denition of them falls dan-
gerously close of unfalsiability. It is hard to think of any human society
in which some type of humanly devised constraint - be it cultural norms,
religious beliefs, formal laws or commonly-held values - would not have a
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signicant inuence on its members. There is, after all, not much left outside
such a denition to inuence human actions.
The empirical literature has been swift to abandon the intellectual heights
of the above denitions for more mundane - and empirically meaningful -
concepts of institutions. Right from the start, the one concrete institutional
element on which all authors agree as a major determinant of economic de-
velopment is the existence of secure property rights. Thus, when Douglass
North decides to advance the English Glorious Revolution as a prime ex-
ample of institutional development leading to the Industrial Revolution, he
casts most of the discussion in terms of property rights (North and Wein-
gast 1989). And most of the empirical literature on the subject, starting
with the inuential work of Acemoglu et al (2001), have used measures of
institutions that invariably relate to the security of property rights (like the
"risk of expropriation" from Political Risk Services or the "constraints on
the executive" from the Polity IV dataset). Accordingly, this paper will
focus on the role of property rights on long-run economic development.
3 Property Rights
The logic linking property rights to economic development is easy to grasp:
people who invest in new capital or -in the case of intellectual property
rights- new ideas expect to have the freedom to use and prot from them as
they see t. If that condition is not met, if people believe that their capital
may be expropriated or their ideas stolen, they will refrain from making
those investments in the rst place. The more likely it is that the sovereign
will alter property rights for his or her own benet, the lower the expected
returns from investment and the lower in turn the incentive to invest(North
and Weingast 1989, p. 803).
Property rights t neatly into the neoclassical and endogenous growth
literatures that constitute our core understanding of the mechanics of eco-
nomic growth. These literatures explain how investments in capital and
ideas turn the wheels of economic growth. If weak property rights lead to
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low levels of investment the consequences for growth can be readily under-
stood.
In order to organize our thoughts it is useful to remain grounded in mod-
ern growth theory and analyze how property rights may a¤ect the accumu-
lation of the two main factors entering an aggregate production function:
capital and ideas. Regarding the links between property rights and capital
accumulation, our discussion will be focused on physical capita and land
- a major factor of production in pre-industrial times. We do not stress
the e¤ects on human capital because the inuence of property rights on its
accumulation is likely to be mainly indirect.
Indeed, human capital di¤ers from physical capital and land in that it
cannot be expropriated or taken away from its owner. The knowledge that
an engineer acquires through his studies cannot be extracted and used by
someone else in the same way that a piece of machinery or a tract of land
can. Human capital cannot be seized, and something that cannot be seized
has no need for protection. Of course, it is still possible to take away the
product of human capital - notably through taxes. Taxes will be discussed
in the next section and the discussion can be understood as applying to
the product of all kinds of capital. We may note here, however, that most
pre-industrial taxes bore little or no relationship to stocks of human capital.
An example of a tax that correlates well with levels of human capital is
the income tax, but its rst introduction in Britain in 1799 postdates the
Industrial Revolution.
On the other hand, human capital accumulation may very well be af-
fected indirectly by the absence of property rights for other factors of pro-
duction. Indeed, human capital may be more useful when combined with
physical capital and ideas. In consequence, we do not disregard the e¤ects
of property rights on human capital accumulation but, by pointing out that
the e¤ect will mainly work through indirect channels we can justify focusing
on the direct e¤ects on physical capital and ideas. We turn to these in what
follows.
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4 Property Rights and Capital Accumulation
The most immediate e¤ect of weak property rights should be on the accu-
mulation of physical capital. We can easily imagine an entrepreneur decid-
ing whether to invest in a new project by calculating its expected prot.
The probability of having his capital expropriated by the government would
surely enter his calculations and potentially deter him from investing.
The theoretical case outlined above is sound and we have nothing to add
to it. An argument, however, may well be theoretically sound and empiri-
cally irrelevant. Improvements in property rights are a logically-consistent
potential explanation for the Industrial Revolution. To be a true explana-
tion, however, it must be veried against the empirical record. Was pre-
industrial Europe a region of poor or inexistent property rights and was an
improvement in these rights what lead to its eventual take-o¤? The case
for that view has been made by North and Weingast (1989), and the con-
clusions of their inuential analysis can be found in subsequent parts of the
literature such as Acemoglu et al. (2005) or Olson (2000).3 As it turns out,
however, much of the evidence available elsewhere in the economic history
literature points to a di¤erent conclusion.
Although capital can be taken away from its rightful owner by the gov-
ernment or by other individuals, most of the literature has focused on the
government as the expropriator-in-chief.4 Grant that the government can
take away private capital mainly in two ways: taxes and outright expro-
priation. If the value of capital is the sum of all actualized future prots
accruing to its owner then taxes, which redirect a share of those prots
3"... after 1688, the greater security of property rights in England led to a huge
expansion of nancial institutions and markets which, North and Weingast (1989) argue,
laid the institutional foundations for the industrial revolution" (Acemoglu et al. 2005, p.
456-457). "Individual rights to property and contract enforcement were probably more
secure in Britain after 1689 than anywhere else, and it was in Britain, not very long after
the Glorious Revolution, that the Industrial Revolution began" (Olson 2000, p. 38).
4This is justiable since expropriation by other individuals, what we call crime and
robbery, has always been present throughout the world and simply requires the use of
some ressources in the form of guards and security systems.
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to the government, are nothing more than partial expropriation (we are of
course overlooking the public goods that those taxes would fund). It follows
that to evaluate the claim that property rights were hindering growth in pre-
industrial Europe we need to look at the level of taxes and the occurrence
of expropriation.
4.1 Capital and taxes
On the subject of taxes there should not be two opinions. Throughout pre-
industrial Europe low taxes were the norm given the signicant limits on
state capacity. England, for instance, was characterized by very low taxes
from the thirteen century until the Glorious Revolution: around 2% or less
of national income if we count only the central government and up to 6% of
national income if we include the church (Clark 2007, p. 148-154). These
numbers were typical not just in Europe but around the world. Whats more
surprising, once Parliament got the upper hand over the English crown in
the setting of new taxes the consequence was more, not less taxes. From
1688 onwards we see the governments share in aggregate output increasing
to levels never seen before (around 20% of national income by the end of the
18th century). From the perspective of tax policy at least, it is di¢ cult to
argue that incentives to capital accumulation were poor during the middle
ages or that they improved during the 18th century.
Furthermore, recent research has revealed that higher taxes in societies
with a more constrained executive branch is not an English exception but a
general characteristic of Europe at least since the mid-17th century. This is
the conclusion reached by Dincecco (2009) after constructing a panel dataset
of per capita taxes in early modern Europe. Regression analysis shows that
taxes tend to be about 60% higher in countries with a limited government,
even after controlling for wars, domestic conicts and rates of urbanization.
Thus, the buildup to the Industrial Revolution was characterized by more,
not less, taxes.
It was not that kings were not interested in higher taxes, but they simply
8
did not have enough power to unilaterally impose their wishes. The clearest
example of this is England, were we observe attempts to increase taxation
being stopped by the nobility as early as 1215 (The Magna Carta) and by
the peasantry as early as 1381 (The Peasants Revolt). As best reected
in John Hampdens statement when refusing to pay a tax that Charles I
was trying to impose without the approval of Parliament, "What an English
King has no right to demand, an English subject has a right to refuse"5.
4.2 Capital and expropriation
Let us then turn our attention to the occurrence of unilateral expropriation
in pre-industrial Europe. One can, of course, nd examples. Henry VIII ex-
propriated church lands and assets en masse during the so-called Dissolution
of the Monasteries, 1536-1541. Edward I expelled all Jews from England in
1290 and duly expropriated their possessions. Note, however, that in the
two examples given above the victim was a particular social group that had
fallen in disfavor and could not defend itself. The Catholic church was under
retreat in northern Europe during the Reformation of the 16th century, and
land conscations had taken place in Sweden (1527), Denmark (1528) and
the Swiss cities of Zurich, Basel and Geneva. And the expulsion and expro-
priation of Jews, sadly, was a recurrent theme in European history since the
Middle Ages. The point is that expropriation was an exceptional measure
used only in exceptional circumstances. English kings could not expropriate
whoever they wanted whenever they wanted, and centuries of law and tradi-
tion supported the nobility in their rights to property. Clear evidence of this
can be seen in the decision of some of Englands most powerful monarchs,
such as Elizabeth I or James I, to sell part of their lands in order to nance
war e¤orts. Clearly, expropriating landowners was not a feasible policy.
Our best hope to quantify the degree of property right protection in pre-
industrial Europe is to look at interest rates or rates of return on private
capital. A world in which capital investments are permanently subject to
5This quote is found in several places but its original source is not given. You can nd
it, for instance, in John Hampden Society (2009).
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unilateral expropriation would be characterized by high rates of return to
compensate investors for the risk incurred. Note that it is interest rates on
private debt that matter here. The point is of importance because North
and Weingasts (1989) sole evidence on the improvement in Englands insti-
tutions after 1688 is the falling rates on public debt. Interest rates on public
debt tell us about the reliability of the state as a debtor; but say nothing
about the security of private property rights. If anything, falling interest
rates on public debt could denote that the state can pay its debts easily by
expropriating its subjects.
As it turns out, research has shown that rates of return on private capital
have been quite low in England since the late 14th century (Epstein 2000, p.
62; Clark 2007, p. 167-169) and that their slowly decreasing trend su¤ered
no notable alteration following the Glorious Revolution (Clark 1996, Quinn
2001). The Glorious Revolution may have mattered a lot for government
nances, but it had no e¤ect on the (already secure) private property rights.
Private capital was rewarded in England at the tone of 5% per year since
the mid-1400s, a rate quite in line with those observed on similar types of
investments nowadays.6 If the rate of return on private capital is a good
indicator of the risk of expropriation then this risk has not changed much
in England between the Renaissance and our times.
What we have said for England is also true for Western Europe. Epstein
(2000, 2005) and van Zanden (2009) have shown that the most signicant de-
crease in private rates of return in Europe occurred during the 14th century,
probably following the Black Death, when rates fell from around 10-11%
to about 7%. Rates continued to fall gently afterwards, but Europe can be
characterized as a continent of moderate rates of return on private capital for
6The comparison with current rates of return ought to be made in real terms. Ination
was nerly zero in pre-industrial times, so the gure of 5% can be taken as the real rate
of return for pre-industrial times. It refers to investments in land and housing (Clark
2007). Real rates of return for the 20th century have been reported by Campbell et al.
(2001). For the period 1926-1998 they have averaged 7.4% for US stocks and 2.2% for
US government bonds. The risk of investments in land and housing may be placed in
between that of stocks and government bonds, which implies that the gure of 5% from
pre-industrial times is roughly what we would expect today.
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about 400 years before the Industrial Revolution. Moreover, Epstein (2000,
2005) and Homer (1963) clearly show that England was not exceptional in
the European context. In fact, if interest rates on private debt are a guide
to the security of property rights the institutional view should have focused
on the city-states of Northern Italy and on the Dutch Republic as the logical
birthplace of the Industrial Revolution. English rates did not become low
by European standards until the 18th century - while still remaining higher
than Dutch rates (Homer 1963).
But the indirect evidence provided by rates of return on private capital
is not the only reason to believe that private property rights were secure in
pre-industrial Europe. Direct evidence can be found by noting that private
investors were eager to take advantage of new investment opportunities,
and that the capital stock of pre-industrial economies was far from being
static. We illustrate this below with two examples, which demonstrate the
responsiveness of capital investments to new market developments many
centuries before the Industrial Revolution.
A rst example is the spread of the printing press. The printing press
constitutes an ideal case study since its invention (in Europe) is tied to a
specic time and place: Mainz, Germany, in the 1440s (the Gutenberg Bible
was printed sometime between 1452 and 1454). In what constitutes a re-
markable case of private capital responding to new investment opportunities,
by 1500 printing presses were found in 205 European cities from Portugal
to Poland and everywhere in between.7 A printing press represented a ma-
jor capital investment: a complete set would cost the equivalent of 4 to 10
years worth of a craftsmans wages. Capital nancing by banks or wealthy
individuals was therefore essential, and this would not take place without
relatively secure property rights.
A second example can be found in what is perhaps the most important
form of industrial capital in the European Middle Ages: the mills. Mills
7Dittmar (2010). For the e¤ects of the printing press on book production and book
prices see Van Zanden (2009, chapter 6).
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were expensive to build, Langdon (2004, p.179) estimates the cost of English
watermills during the 14th and 15th centuries as at least £ 20 and as much as
£ 100 or more. Yet mills were ubiquitous in England: 6,082 of them could be
found in the year 1086 according to the Domesday Book. The maintenance
of this capital stock required very signicant investments that could not be
compatible with insecure property rights. A medieval mill lost about 10%
of its total value each year to depreciation (Langdon 2004, p.180), so the
English private sector had to build the equivalent of 608 new mills each year
merely to maintain its productive capacity.
Thus, private investment in pre-industrial Europe does not give the im-
pression of being heavily restricted by insecure property rights. At any rate,
the risk of expropriation was not important enough to deter investors from
committing large sums of money over long periods of time in the construc-
tion of mills or printing presses.
4.3 What do episodes of sovereign debt default tell us?
As it turns out, the one area where something akin to outright expropria-
tion by European monarchs can be observed with some regularity is in the
many episodes of sovereign debt default. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) have
documented as many as 20 instances of sovereign default on external debt
in Europe before the 19th century (the number would be larger if we add
defaults on domestic debt). Douglass North has interpreted these events
as evidence of the insecurity of property rights: "The Crowns inability to
honor its contractual agreements for borrowed funds is a visible indicator of
its readiness to alter the rights of private parties in its own favor" (North
and Weingast 1989, p. 810).
We would argue, however, that episodes of sovereign debt default are
better seen as evidence of the monarchs weaknesses - not of his strength.
Kings built up debts precisely because they were unable to tap into alter-
native sources of nancing such as outright expropriation of their subjects
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assets or unilateral increases in taxation. As an example, the debt default
of Philip II of Spain in 1575 was prompted by the refusal from the Span-
ish Cortes to raise the sales taxes as the king demanded (Drelichman and
Voth, forthcoming). Not only that, but kings were forced into long and
acrimonious negotiations with their creditors; in a manner that reminds
the negotiations between todays developing countries with the IMF. When
Philip II suspended payments on its debt in 1575, his Genoese bankers pe-
nalized him by imposing an embargo on all currency transfers between the
crown and its troops waging war in the Netherlands. The unpaid army mu-
tinied and sacked the Spanish-loyal city of Antwerp on 4 November 1576,
in a cruel episode that passed into history books as the Spanish Fury. As
a result, the loyalist provinces of the Low Countries united with the rebel-
lious Holland and Zeeland for the purpose of expelling the Spanish army.
This was a costly loss for Philip II, who was forced to reach an agreement
with his bankers and pay his arrears (Conklin 1998). Kings, at any rate in
pre-industrial Europe, were much less powerful than is sometimes assumed.
Moreover, interpreting the occurrence of sovereign debt defaults as cases
of capital expropriation misses one essential point: the fact that interest rates
on public debt were very high during this period precisely to compensate
lenders for the risk of default. In other words, lenders were receiving on
average a fair return for their money - even when we take into account
payment delays and interruptions. The ex-post real rate of return of Genoese
lending to the crown of Spain has been estimated to be between 8 and 14%; a
handsome premium for the risk incurred8. And the interest rate on English
public debt was 14% in the early 1690s (North and Weingast 1989, p. 823)
which, if we assume a probability of total default of 5% per year i.e. one
default episode every 20 years, would still leave an ex-post rate of return of
9%.
To summarize, the available evidence contradicts the idea of a pre-
industrial Europe of all-powerful monarchs and indiscriminate expropriation.
8Cited in Conklin (1998, p. 492). See Drelichman and Voth (forthcoming) for more
recent calculations.
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Instead, we see a picture where private capital was remunerated modestly,
investment took place regularly, and kings were forced into debt by their
inability to raise taxes unilaterally or expropriate their subjects.
4.4 Developing countries today
Turning to the case of developing countries today, the evidence for weak
property rights appears to be more solid. That, at least, is what the mea-
sures of property rights protection most commonly used in the literature
show. PRS"risk of expropriation" or Polity IVs "executive constraints",
for instance, show a clear correlation with levels of GDP per capita of be-
tween 0:70 and 0:80. But this apparently strong evidence may be criticized
on at least two accounts.
First, most popular measures of property right protection - including
those mentioned above - are the outcome of opinion surveys of business
people or expertsassessments. In other words, they are bound to be heavily
inuenced by the image of developing countries in the world. As noted by
Glaeser et al. (2004), measures of institutional quality that do not rely on
subjective assessments show small or no correlation with GDP per capita.
For instance, variables measuring the permanence in o¢ ce of supreme court
judges and the extent of judicial review of legislation have a correlation with
GDP per capita of 0:03 and 0:06 respectively (not statistically di¤erent from
zero in both cases).
A second and related point is that most popular measures used in the
literature are focused on the property rights of international investors. To
a large extent this is inevitable since the assessment of business people or
experts will necessarily be based on the cases and events they know best,
which naturally tend to be those of international investors su¤ering from
nationalization or outright expropriation. While such cases are real enough,
they should not be considered as representative of the overall regime of
property protection in the country.
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Nationalizations of international companies, particularly in extractive
industries such as oil or mining, have occurred with some regularity through-
out the developing world.9 There are usually big political rewards and quite
limited risks of pursuing such nationalization policies. Foreign rms are
ideal scapegoats for the ills of a nation, and left-leaning governments have
had little di¢ culty portraying them as the vanguard of (American, British,
French) imperialism. Periods of high commodity prices lead to huge prots
for the foreign companies, giving the obvious impression that these are rob-
bing the country of its wealth. The great majority of the population would
support the measure as a matter of principle, while the local elite would
hope to benet from it by inheriting the control of the nationalized rms.
The only risk would be the reaction from foreign governments, which in any
case would have no e¤ect on the governments control of the country.
Nationalizing domestic rms is a di¤erent proposition altogether since
it carries major political risks by antagonizing domestic forces. Just as
kings in pre-industrial Europe, third-world governments are rarely in such
a strong position that they can risk a battle with the local elite. Accord-
ingly, examples of nationalization of domestic rms are rather rare and are
concentrated in extreme episodes such as the 1917 communist takeover in
Russia. For most developing countries today the risk of expropriation of
domestic rms appears to be very di¤erent and much lower than the risk
facing foreign rms in extractive industries.
If instead of relying on the measures used in the literature we look at
one of the magnitudes that guided our discussion of pre-industrial Europe,
the real interest rate, we see a di¤erent picture. Figure 1 plots the average
real interest rate over the period 1980-2008 against the log of GDP per
capita for 169 developed and developing countries10. It is apparent that
9To name some salient examples, Mexico nationalized its oil industry in 1938, Iran did
the same in 1951, Chile nationalized its copper mines in 1971, Venezuela its oil industry
in 1976, Bolivia its tin mines in 1952 and its gas industry in 2006.
10Source: World Bank (2009). The real interest rate is dened as the lending interest
rate adjusted for ination as measured by the GDP deator. The average is taken over all
available observations over the period 1980-2008, which for some countries is considerable
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no relationship exists between the two variables, belying the idea that real
rates tend to be higher in poorer countries. The result can be conrmed by a
linear regression showing no statistically signicant relationship between real
interest rates and GDP per capita. If real interest rates provide an overall
assessment of the risk of expropriation to domestic rms then gure 1 suggest
that expropriation in developing countries may be much less prevalent than
commonly thought.
A nal point is in order to lead us into the next section. The emphasis
that much of the literature puts on property rights and capital accumulation
sits uncomfortably besides a central tenet of economic growth theory: that
growth, in the long run, is essentially a matter of technological progress.
Growth due to capital accumulation would run into decreasing returns and
stall in the absence of technological progress; just imagine how much would
pre-industrial agriculture have progressed through an endless accumulation
of ploughs and hoes and no invention of synthetic fertilizer and tractors.
Thus, the explanation for the Industrial Revolution and the di¤erences be-
tween poor and rich countries should be sought in the process of creating
and adopting new technology and, according to the institutional view, in
the presence or absence of intellectual property rights.11
5 Property Rights and Ideas: Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights
Contrary to the preceding section, the case for the relationship between
property rights and the production of new ideas may be challenged both
on the theoretical and on the empirical side - and we turn to each type of
argument in what follows.
less than the maximum of 29 observations.
11A large part of the empirical growth literature, what is known as "development ac-
counting", has also underscored the primacy of technology over capital accumulation.
Caselli (2005) summarizes the state of this literature and o¤ers some insightful exten-
sions.
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5.1 Theoretical considerations
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) give the creator of an idea certain exclu-
sive rights over its creation; notably the right to benet from its commercial
exploitation through a legal monopoly. These rights take mainly the form of
patents and copyrights.12 The theoretical case for intellectual property pro-
tection relies on the argument that making the invention of new ideas more
protable should have a positive e¤ect on their production. In fact, stan-
dard economic modelling turns intellectual property rights into an absolute
necessity by assuming that ideas are non-rival and that perfect competition
characterizes product markets. If ideas are non-rival they can be reproduced
by anyone at zero cost, meaning that prots would disappear under perfect
competition. Thus, innovators will not be able to recover their R&D costs
and would not engage in the production of new ideas in the rst place, unless
they are given some market power.
This theoretical picture, however, is at odds with reality. While the
abstract concept of an idea may be non-rival, understanding it and nding
an economic use for it require investments that are far from negligible. Take
the ideas of Quantum mechanics, freely available at your local university
library, and ask yourself how easy it would be for you to actually apply
them. Michele Boldrin and David Levine have rightly pointed out that
"abstract, disembodied ideas have no value" (Boldrin and Levine 2008, p.
154). Only copies of the idea embodied in human or physical capital will
have value, like when the ideas of Quantum mechanics are embodied in a
scientist working for your company - a scientist whose human capital is of
course a rival good. Ideas are always costly to learn and implement. If it was
not so, societies would not need to spend signicant shares of their GDPs to
merely transmit freely available ideas such as PythagorasTheorem or the
Periodic Table of Elements to millions of children each year.
12The World Trade Organizations Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) sets the minimum duration of these monopoly rights at 20 years
for patents; while the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic works
establishes that copyrights should last for at least the authors lifetime plus 50 years.
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The consequence of this is that there are sizeable economic rents that
accrue to innovators in the absence of any intellectual property protection.
Since ideas are not textbook non-rival goods, an innovator will always enjoy
a rst-mover advantage as it will be the sole supplier of the new product
in question at least for some time. Copying and reverse engineering does
take time and money, and they are worth the trouble only if the product
being copied enjoys some degree of success (which of course implies that the
innovator has already made some prots). Consumers who are impatient to
get their hands on the new product will not wait for cheap copies to reach
the market. And even when competitors arrive with cheaper alternatives to
the market the innovator will enjoy the prestige and brand visibility from
being the rst, which should ensure her at least some additional prot.
Moreover, there exist several indirect nancial benets that innovators
can reap even if they were to give away their ideas for free. Individual inno-
vators will establish themselves as experts in their elds and will command
high fees for their future services. Some innovative rms let people use their
ideas freely and make prots by providing complementary services or by sell-
ing to other rms access to their customer base. A good example is Google,
whose world-leading search engine can be used by anyone for free but has
managed to make huge prots mainly from advertising.
Of course, the above arguments only say that some nancial benets
exist in the absence of IPRs and therefore that some innovative activity
will take place. Critics may argue that IPRs, by increasing the rewards to
innovation, will lead to more ideas and therefore more growth. That conclu-
sion, however, is far from being obvious since the protection of intellectual
property through patents and copyrights entails important costs that ought
to be considered as well.
A rst and obvious cost, fully recognized in the economic growth lit-
erature, is the classical deadweight loss from monopoly pricing. For the
duration of the monopoly rights, society will consume too little and pay too
much for the innovation - whose di¤usion will be retarded accordingly.
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But that is only the beginning. Technological progress itself will be ham-
pered since an innovator can block the use of his idea by other innovators.
This is of particular importance since, as emphasized by much of the en-
dogenous growth literature, ideas enter into the production function of new
ideas. Some of historys best-known patented inventions have been used
in this way: James Watt was able to temporally block the development of
better steam engines (notably that of Jonathan Hornblower) and Alexander
Graham Bell was able to temporally block the development of better tele-
phones (notably that of Thomas Alva Edison).13 This, incidentally, points
to an additional social cost of intellectual property rights: bright minds such
as Watt and Bell are diverted from innovation to rent-seeking.
Finally, we should not disregard the fact that intellectual property rights
are costly to administer and even more costly to enforce. Their administra-
tion requires the establishment of a public bureaucracy where innovators will
spend time and resources making their case. Their enforcement uses signif-
icant resources from the judicial system and demands large legal costs from
both defendants and prosecutors. In some cases, like software and music
piracy over the internet, the enforcement costs would be so high that gov-
ernments just turn a blind eye to the practice - hardly a desirable outcome
for otherwise law-abiding societies.
Because of all the above mentioned costs, society may end up worse o¤
after introducing intellectual property rights - and it is not even guaranteed
that innovative activity will increase. Douglas North has insisted that intel-
lectual property rights should be benecial since they increase the private
marginal benet of producing new ideas, moving the equilibrium towards
the social optimum.14 The analysis comes straightforward from Arthur Ce-
cil Pigous seminal work on the e¤ects of externalities in his classic The
13See Mokyr (1990, p. 88 & 247) and Boldrin and Levine (2008, chapter 1).
14"What determines the rate of development of new technology and of pure scientic
knowledge? In the case of technological change, the social rate of return from developing
new techniques had probably always been high; but we would expect that until the means
to raise the private rate of return from developing new techniques was devised, there would
be slow progress in producing new techniques. [...] Typically, innovations could be copied
at no cost by others and without any reward to the inventor or innovator. The failure to
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Economics of Welfare (see, in particular, chapter 9 in Pigou 1932). It is
easy to argue, however, that Norths analysis is incomplete. While intel-
lectual property rights may shift the private marginal benet of innovation
upwards, it is also the case that they move the social marginal benet of
innovation downwards: every new idea is less socially-benecial due to the
monopoly pricing, rent-seeking and cost of enforcement problems mentioned
above. If these two curves are moving then Pigous framework no longer
gives an unambiguous answer; social welfare may well end up decreasing.15
5.2 Empirical arguments
All of the above should lessen our condence on the general theoretical
argument for intellectual property rights as benecial - let alone essential -
for innovation and growth. While theoretical arguments apply to any time
and place, additional arguments can be put forward against the idea that
IPRs were a major explanatory factor of the Industrial Revolution.
Innovation in pre-industrial times did not involve the million-sized R&D
budgets of todays major corporations. Economic historians have long sus-
tained that small and incremental innovations sum up to most of the e¢ -
ciency gains during the Industrial Revolution (Jones 1981, Rosenberg 1982,
Mokyr 1990). Human ingenuity was the main element; as Joel Mokyr put
it: "A typical innovator in those years was a dexterous and mechanically
inclined person who became aware of a technical problem to be solved and
guessed approximately how to go about solving it." (Mokyr 1990, p. 83-84).
Such innovations take place through learning by doing, and the relatively
modest nancial costs they required were likely to be covered by the rents
develop systematic property rights in innovation up until fairly modern times was a major
source of the slow pace of technological change." (North 1981, p.164).
15 Interestingly, Pigou himself did not believe that intellectual property rights would fos-
ter innovation; although for di¤erent reasons: "The patent laws aim, in e¤ect, at bringing
marginal private net product and marginal social net product more closely together. By
o¤ering the prospect of reward for certain types of invention they do not, indeed, appre-
ciably stimulate inventive activity, which is, for the most part, spontaneous, but they do
direct it into channels of general usefulness." (Pigou 1932, p. 185).
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that accrue to an innovator in the absence of any intellectual property pro-
tection.
Accordingly, there is considerable evidence against the idea that intel-
lectual property rights played a major role in the Industrial Revolution.
Patents were not invented in England with the Statute of Monopolies of
1623, they existed in the Netherlands since the 16th century and in north-
ern Italy since the 15th century - begging the question of why they did not
foster an Industrial Revolution there. Moser (2004, 2005) has analyzed all
innovations presented at the World Fairs of 1851 and 1876 and has shown
that only 11% of British inventions and 14% of American ones were patented.
Even more telling, countries with no patent laws (Switzerland and Denmark
in 1851, Switzerland and the Netherlands in 1876) did not have less inno-
vations per capita and had a disproportionately large share of the medals
awarded in these fairs to the best innovations.
As argued by Mokyr (2009), patents may have played a role in the imagi-
nary of would-be innovators but the reality was di¤erent. During the Indus-
trial Revolution the cost of obtaining a patent were very high in England:
the equivalent of 37,000 US dollars of the year 1998 (Lerner 2000). Patents
were also di¢ cult to enforce, and doing so implied large additional costs.
The consequence was that few innovators actually proted from the patent
system at the time. A good proof of this is that the English Parliament felt
contrived to o¤er awards and pensions to some of the best-known innovators
of the Industrial Revolution despite the fact that they had obtained patents
(Mokyr 2009).
Turning our attention to developing countries nowadays, the case for the
importance of intellectual property rights is equally problematic. Most of
the worlds innovation is carried out in the developed world, and developing
countries gain from imitating and coping these ideas. Intellectual property
rights would only hinder this process by prohibiting developing countries
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from using these ideas or forcing them to pay fees to the patent holders in
developed nations.
Of course, there are many additional mechanisms that can come into
play. For instance, in the absence of intellectual property rights in developing
countries some ideas that are only useful for them may not get produced
(Diwan and Rodrik 1989). There is a large theoretical literature on the
subject and the results concerning the overall e¤ect of intellectual property
rights in developing countries tend to be ambiguous.16 Our aim here is
not to resolve the ambiguities of this literature but simply to point out
that a policy that is so di¢ cult to prove as unambiguously benecial for
developing countries should not be regarded as a likely explanation of the
large gap between them and developed nations.
Note as well that the World Trade Organizations TRIPS agreement, re-
sponsible for the introduction of intellectual property rights throughout the
developing world, was promoted exclusively by the United States, Europe
and Japan and was consistently opposed by numerous developing nations
notably Brazil, India, South Korea and Mexico.17 Do we really believe that
developing country governments are so obtuse that they would uniformly op-
pose a piece of legislation that was benecial for them? The case of China,
both the fastest-growing developing country of the last two decades and a
notorious infringer of intellectual property rights, should convince us that -
at the very least - rapid economic development can perfectly take place in
the absence of strong protection of intellectual property.
To sum up, a large range of theoretical and empirical arguments can
be invoked against the idea that intellectual property rights are essential
for economic growth and, with even more force, against the idea that they
played a large role in the advent of the Industrial Revolution.
16See, inter alia, Deardor¤ (1992), Helpman (1993), Lai and Qiu (2003), Angeles (2005),
Parello (2008) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010).
17For a detailed account of TRIPSnegotiating history see Gervais (2003).
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6 Conclusions
This paper has argued at length that the current emphasis on property
rights as a fundamental driver of economic development may be overstated.
Property rights have become a widely accepted answer to the questions of
why the Industrial Revolution took place in the western world and why
so many developing countries still lag behind the rich ones. The current
intellectual climate favours institutional engineering, and could distract us
from alternative lines of research.
The core of our arguments have been shaped in two parts. First, we
have argued that the case for the importance of property rights on capital
accumulation, while theoretically sound, lacks empirical support. There is
solid evidence that property rights were respected in pre-industrial Europe:
low rates of return on private capital, episodes of rapid investment in new
forms of physical capital, and well-documented di¢ culties that kings faced
for raising taxes or expropriating their subjects. As for the developing world
we can at least point out that real interest rates are on average similar to
those of developed countries.
Second, we have argued that the case for the importance of property
rights on the production of ideas can be challenged both on theoretical and
empirical grounds. On the theory side, we have argued that innovations can
take place in the absence of intellectual property rights and that the intro-
duction of such rights, while raising the rents of current innovators, creates
important costs for society and for would-be innovators. On a purely theo-
retical basis, intellectual property rights can be proved detrimental without
much trouble. The empirical evidence further weakens the case for the
importance of intellectual property rights in pre-industrial Europe or in to-
days developing world. Research has shown that most innovations were not
patented in pre-industrial Europe, that countries without a patent system
innovated as much as those that did have one and that most innovations
during this period were small and incremental - and would take place irre-
spective of the patent system. The case may be even less favorable for the
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developing world, where large gains can be expected from freely imitating
the stock of ideas from the developed world rather than having to pay for
it. Developing countriesown attitudes can be taken as evidence of revealed
preferences against intellectual property protection.
While we do believe that the case for property rights has been overstated,
it is not our intention to portray institutions in general as unimportant. In
their broadest sense, such as those given by Douglass North and Avner Greif
in the denitions transcribed in section 2 of this paper, institutions must be
important. The challenge, however, is to determine what specic institu-
tions are important and whether any of them could satisfactorily explain
phenomena such as the Industrial Revolution or the gulf between rich and
poor countries. This paper has analyzed the evidence for one such specic
institution, property rights protection, and has found it wanting.
A more modest hypothesis for the role of institutions in economic de-
velopment would be that particular countries at a particular time may be
signicantly a¤ected by specic institutional arrangements - which di¤er
from case to case. Institutions may be important in some cases, but no sin-
gle institutional structure can explain economic development (or lack of it)
throughout the world. As it turns out, surprisingly strong evidence for this
more limited role of institutions can be found in the literature. Examples of
papers analyzing the consequences of concrete institutional arrangements in
clearly circumscribed areas include Banerjee and Iyer (2005) on revenue col-
lection in di¤erent districts of colonial India, Dell (2010) on the mita labour
system in the highlands of Peru and Berger (2009) on tax policy in colonial
Nigeria. Contrary to the cross-country literature cited in the introduction,
these papers do not aim to prove that institutions are the ultimate source of
economic growth everywhere and every time. Instead, they provide convinc-
ing evidence that particular institutional arrangements may have sizeable
long-term consequences in particular areas such as bureaucratic capacity,
health, education and household consumption.
To this more modest approach of institutional analysis we can subscribe.
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Institutions have their place in explanations of growth and development but
their form should be made explicit for each time and place and we should
not expect the same institutional explanation to t all cases.
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Figure 1 
Real interest rates and GDP per capita around the world, 1980-2008 
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